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Abstract
Paul A. Volcker’s opening remarks for “The Global Capital Market: What’s Next?” Mr.
Vocker introduces a discussion on globalization and whether the changes that globalization has
made in economic policy will have long-term viability.

PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS
Paul A. Volcker*
We meet today to discuss the subject of "The Global Capital
Market: What Next?" It's a brave man who is going to speak with
great authority on what's next. I presume only a group of lawyers would venture to take on this abstruse and large subject.
I have a limited role. My function mainly is to listen and
raise some provocative questions. I assume that with my advancing years, I am supposed to provide some perspective. Let me
briefly do so.
We can hardly get a sentence out of our mouths these days
without talking about globalization, whatever the subject is. I
would like to remind you that in the area of international finance, globalization is not new. In fact, so far as I know, the
high-water mark for international investment was around 1913,
on the eve of World War I. Recently, a political scientist reminded me that that was also a period when everybody was congratulating themselves on peace and prosperity and that the
prospect of war and destruction was extremely remote. At that
time, the United Kingdom, of course, was the center of the financial world: in the years before World War I, the United Kingdom was exporting capital equivalent to about ten percent of its
gross national product. I do not know of any developed country
that has approached that degree of capital outflow in recent
years. Naturally, the ten percent capital equivalent represented
a net figure. It may be true - and I assume it is - that there
are larger gross figures, due to the modern infrastructures we
have to facilitate capital flows and quick decision-making.
I do want to emphasize, however, that while a lot has
changed, much has not. At the turn of the twentieth century,
carrier pigeons did not dominate the world of international finance. Communications could move pretty rapidly then with
the telegraph and the Morse Code. We had securitization. The
idea of international bond issues is hardly new. It dates well
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back into the nineteenth century. We had lawyers: I sometimes
wonder whether the laws that were enacted a hundred years ago
are complicating or facilitating things these days. Most of all,
herd instincts in the international and domestic arenas impacted
markets during the nineteenth century as they arguably do today, with waves of investment and optimism or disappointment.
Of course, there have been changes. I suspect there is a lot
more diversity among borrowers and lenders these days. Markets have become more depersonalized. Theyare packaged and
repackaged in a way that the ultimate borrower or lender may
not have as much contact with each other as they presumably did
a long time ago. I think there are a lot more short-term flows,
more movement back and forth, all at an accelerating rate. I
would point out, too, that in the industrialized countries' markets there is a lot more volatility today than there was a hundred
years ago. At the very least, there is a degree of volatility in foreign exchange markets that would not have seemed natural at all
at the beginning of the century. There is no gold standard today
and developed countries do not have fixed exchange rates.
Now, let me suggest that beneath all of these issues there
are some fundamental underlying questions which have been set
forward for our participants to discuss. I suppose the broadest
question centers on the balance of capital supply and demand in
the world. One of the curious phenomena, true for some time
now, is that the richest country in the world, the United States,
has also been its biggest borrower. According to economic textbooks, money is supposed to flow from the rich to the poor. To
some extent, the money has been flowing from the poor to the
rich, particularly to the United States. The United States, due to
its size, can make a substantial difference to the whole world.
That reflects a very low level of savings in the United States and a
tendency for very high levels of savings among the poorer countries. If one looks at general trends, the rate of savings in other
developed countries, which typically has been substantially
higher than in the United States, is also tending to decline.
Now, we are looking at the next stage in international capital markets. All the industrialized countries, in one degree or
another, led by Japan, reflect something of a generational crisis.
The industrialized world will experience an increase in the
number of retired people in the coming decades and a large
decrease in the number of workers per retiree, assuming that no
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cataclysm or enormous change in the age of retirement occurs.
This trend will impact domestic and international capital markets, because the retirees are presumably spenders and the workers are savers. With fewer workers and more spenders, an interesting question arises as to where we will get the money to support the transfer of consumption that this socio-economic trend
implies.
A moment ago, I touched upon the volatility of international capital flows, or domestic capital flows. Let me just mention, however, one aspect of that from the international standpoint, as illustrated recently by Mexico, Thailand, and Eastern
Europe. A country that follows what are perceived to be good
policies, and in fact may be good policies, will understandably
attract investment. Capital will then inundate these countries
that are relatively small compared to the size of world capital
markets. Therefore, a somewhat marginal swing in portfolio
managers' decisions to invest money in a particular country can
provide a very large amount of money in that country relative to
the size of its economy. When those decisions change, which
they can rather rapidly, a lot of money can flow out of a country
in a short period of time and present extremely difficult
problems of economic management. How this trend will develop in the years ahead is an important question for world
policymakers as well as for market participants.
Regarding the Glass-Steagall Act' and the legislative outlook, we happen to have participants in this panel from Japan
and the United States, where both political systems are considering institutional change. In the United States, perhaps more
markedly than in Japan, lawyers have aided and abetted a lot of
change without much legislation. I recently testified on American legislation. Gordon Baxter, trying to remember an issue
that had come up in a hearing ten years earlier, read a statement
that I had made at the time before a similar congressional committee. I could have used that previous testimony verbatim in
1997. This illustrates that the American legislative process has
moved extremely slowly, but there has been an enormous
amount of defacto change.
I just returned from a short trip to Japan, where I participated in a conference on deregulation in Japan. Conference
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1988).
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participants set forth enormously ambitious proposals. We debated whether the actual legislative process would be as slow as
that in the United States, given the politics and bureaucracy and
the current contest in the United States between the different
market participants. We shall see, and Mr. Gyohten can tell us.
I will conclude with an underlying question which concerns
us all as citizens and participants. There have been enormous
changes in economic policy and ideology, notably open markets,
liberalism, and international capital flows, to name a few. While
we all encourage those changes, the question remains whether
improved economic performance will reflect these changes
within a reasonable period of time. While we like to think so,
the evidence to date is rather mixed.
Without going into the details, and forgetting about the
debt crisis of the 1980s, recent growth has not marked Latin
America in the current decade, despite economic growth characterizing the years prior to 1980 when economic policies were
quite different. The outcomes in Eastern Europe and Russia are
still uncertain. Japan has had a very sluggish growth period. In
recent years, Europe has had unemployment rates not seen since
World War II. In terms of economic performance, the United
States stands out as the great gem of the ocean, or two oceans.
In the United States, however, even if we believe the figures,
there is some lingering doubt as to the stellar economic performance because productivity growth has been slow compared
to the earlier post-war period.
Deregulation, freedom, and liberalization are particularly
noticeable in the important area of capital markets. I think during this conference we can raise questions about and comment
on the prospects of when that very dramatic change in economic
policy that is considered so constructive will actually have the
kind of payoff that assures its long-time viability.

